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AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND THE SENSE OF
THE PROFESSION*
EUGENE V. ROSTOW'iI *
I
The argument of this lecture can be summed up in four simple
propositions:
First, we are all ultimately the creatures of our philosophies. We
dance in patterns determined by our pasts, to tunes we hardly know
we know. Our acts are governed by an anthology of principles, myths,
illusions and memories which jostle together in our heads, and in our
hearts. Sometimes, at rare moments in the history of civilization,
if good philosophers ever actually did become Kings, the dominant
working rules of a culture might be dignified as rational and consistent
systems of ideas. Normally, they represent a far more human mixture
of the sensible and the absurd. From time to time, as we have
bitter reason to know, the springs of action have been demonic
creeds of hatred and conquest, based on driving beliefs about the
supremacy of race, or faith, or class, or nation. Whatever their
philosophical quality, however comfortable or uncomfortable they
make us, or others, we are possessed by our ideas. They determine
how we see and respond to the circumstances of our lives. And
through our responses, the notions in our minds in their turn help
to shape the world in which we have our being.
The second step in my argument is that the influence of ideas
on events is especially marked in the realms of law, which can never
cease its striving for rule by "principle." American law and American
lawyers today are products of a tradition of thought and experience
which embraces several incompatible premises. This fact exposes our
law, and the society which seeks to govern itself through law, to the
tension of unresolved conflict. Anxieties about the nature of law,
and about the propriety of the way in which our legal institutions are
functioning, - and, most notably, in recent years, anxiety about the
propriety of the modes of action of the Supreme Court of the United
States - have exacerbated the tension which is inevitable in the
normal operations of any living system of law. For legal institutions
must always perform three functions which cause strain under the
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best of circumstances: They must endlessly adjust the formal, stated
rules of law to the pace of social and moral change. They must seek to
raise the level of social behavior, and of the law in practice, up to
that of the accepted standards of law. And thirdly, the law fails
in its most important function unless all its agencies strive, through
their own approved procedures, and according to their accepted
rules, to bring the standards of the law closer to those of the ideal
for law cherished by those with authority to speak for our culture
in stating its law.1
The third proposition I shall seek to defend is that the prevailing
American philosophy of law - the largely unstated code by which in
fact we live, as lawyers and as citizens - prescribes a standard
of high social responsiblity for lawyers as judges, advocates,
counsellors, legislators and law professors. That standard is implicit
in the view, which I believe is now rightly dominant in our culture,
that law is not, in Blackstone's phrase, " 'a rule of civil conduct, pre-
scribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right
and prohibiting what is wrong,' "la but rather a system of social
order, an accepted procedure for making certain social decisions.
Inescapably, the procedure of law must utilize general propositions
and sets of propositions, the so-called "rules of law." Pound has
described this "scientific element" in the law functionally as "a reason-
ed body of principles for the administration of justice ... a means
towards the end of law, which is the administration of justice....
Law is not scientific for the sake of science. Being scientific as a
means toward an end, it must be judged by the results it achieves,
not by the niceties of its internal structure; it must be valued by
the extent to which it meets its end, not by the beauty of its logical
processes or the strictness with which its rules proceed from the dogmas
it takes for its foundation,"2
And finally, in the fourth part of the lecture, I shall try to apply
this conclusion to some concrete and ordinary problems to illustrate
the kind of responsibilities I believe we have as American lawyers.
I shall concentrate on two of the many kinds of dilemmas which
arise when we seek to evaluate the performance of our legal insti-
tutions in the light of these standards: the work of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and that of the organized bar. The
contention of the fourth section will be that the Supreme Court of
the United States has been meeting its responsibilities at a high level
of accomplishment, on the average, making due allowance for the
ebb and flow of the common-law process of adjudication and for the
shortcomings of men even when they are Justices, but that the rest
I. This proposition is discussed in ROSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM 363-64
(1959) .
la. I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES -44.
2. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
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of the profession of law is not now rising to the challenge of its public
responsibilities very well~certainly not well enough-and that in
certain areas our performance is lamentably poor.
II
I shall not linger long tonight on the first theme of my argu-
ment-that our lives are dominated, for better or for worse, by
ideas as well as by economic interests, technologies and the imper-
sonal tides of social change. A generation which has suffered the
consequences of Hitler, and is only beginning to confront Marxism
as a fighting faith, can hardly doubt the role of ideas in history. I
do not mean to suggest that the steam engine and its successors did
not revolutionize the context of our lives, nor that history can be
interpreted without reference to science, economics, human stupidity,
or the art and accident of war. Nor do I wish to propose, recalling
Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin's brilliant metaphor, that the hedgehogs
are right in seeing the world as a unitary vision, and the faxes are
wrong in sensing the separateness and contradictions of social happen-
ings.3 ,,yhat I do mean is that in the end, as Heine once said, the
"proud men of action ... are nothing but unconscious instruments
of .the men of thought." Holmes put it very well, celebrating
Marshall's anniversary:
[T] his day marks the fact that all thought is social, is
on its way to action; that, to borrow the expression of a
French writer, every idea tends to become first a catechism
and then a code; and that according to its worth his un-
helped mediation may one day mount a throne, and without
armies, or even with them, may shoot across the world the
electric despotism of an unresisted power. It is all a symbol,
if you like, but so is the flag. The flag is but a bit of
bunting to one who insists on prose,4
The thesis is often challenged, and it is hardly beyond debate.
But I find it difficult to deny, especially in the United States, where
the germinal ideas of the Declaration of Independence and of the
Constitution have played such a central role in framing our destinies.
The thought should be especially vivid in our minds now, as we
commemorate the Civil War our fathers fought to vindicate the
abstract and even mystical thought that the Union of the American
people was indissoluble by the States.
III
The power of men's loyalty to their ideas is nowhere so visible
as in the law. Whether. we view law through Blackstone's eyes or
through Pound's, as readers of Austin or of Thurman Arnold, certain
intractable features of the landscape are clear. We can think of
3. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox (1953).
4. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270-71 (1920).
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law in terms of many competing and complementary definitions: as
a code of rules laid down by a sovereign, a process of social decision,
a prediction of when the public force will be invoked, a pattern of
approved social behavior, more or less effectively acknowledged by
courts and legislatures - the number of such formulae is almost
infinite. Whatever the starting point or the end-product of our
analysis, we cannot ignore the fact that the law is featured by rules,
articulated and re-articulated in more or less abstract form, and
that these rules playa part in the outcome of cases and other legal
controversies. The art of generalization, we know, has an indis-
pensable role in the legal process, and is an indispensable feature
of law as an institution of order. This generalizing aspect of law
derives from the basic moral principle, acknowledged by every legal
system we know anything about, that similar cases should be decided
alike. The principle of equality before the law is easy to recite,
and infinitely difficult to apply. It lies behind the weight given to
precedent in legal systems, and gives force to the yearning for cer·
tainty and predictability in law which each generation has expressed,
in vain, since the beginnings of recorded time.
In the generation of lawyers and judges who prevailed in England
and America about a hundred years ago, the rationalizing, system-
building component of law became oppressive. Deference to pre-
cedent became not one wise principle among many in the growth
of law, but a rigid and restrictive absolute, which is still considered
to be at least the nominal rule of decision in England.5 The men
of that day, intoxicated by the notion of law as a science, freed at
last of its religious past, began to think of it as a self-contained body
of rational precepts. They treated its rules not as tentative hypotheses,
advanced to explain shifting bodies of social behavior, but as fixed
propositions, laws of nature and of "reason" in some magical sense,
sustained by autonomous authority, and capable of surviving un-
changed for indefinite periods of time. The so-called rules of law,
which subsumed and organized groups and patterns of decisions, were
invoked without reference to the purposes they had been called into
being to serve, and without considering whether those ends were
still appropriate. Orations at bar association meetings, and at the
funerals of departed legal worthies, invoked the grandeur of "eternal
principles" of law. The legal texts of the time, and the teaching
in law schools, followed the same pattern. Whole areas of the law
were reduced to the symmetry and consistency of logical order, with
all their features clear, and clearly derived from two or three general
propositions deemed self-evident. Thus the dream was revived of
law as a code of rules, and no more, so that with a little effort we
5. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (1961); WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION (1961).
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could achieve its restatement in books that would not fill a single
shelf. Then judgment could be found, not made, and society could
at long last enjoy a stable, certain and perfectly predictable legal
order. 6
I sometimes wonder whether the lawyers of the day really
believed in the "mechanical jurisprudence" they professed, and
against which Roscoe Pound's early articles inveighed with such
vehemence. After all, we live by a philosophy of law even when
we have no legal philosophers to tell us what it is, or when they
describe it inaccurately. The centuries-old habits of the common law
survived the strait-jacket of what Karl N. Llewellyn has recently called
the Formal Style of thought about law. Professor Llewellyn describes
the phenomenon, which is still too much with us, in these terms:
The Formal Style is of peculiar interest to us because
it set the picture against which all modern thinking has
played-call it, as of the last eighty or ninety years, "the
orthodox ideology." That picture is clean and clear; the
rules of law are to decide the cases; policy is for the legisla-
ture, not for the courts, and so is change even in pure com-
mon law. Opinions run in deductive form with an air
or expression of single-line inevitability. "Principle" is a
generalization producing order which can and should be
used to prune away those "anomalous" cases or rules which
do not fit, such cases or rules having no function except,
in places where the supposed "principle" does not work well,
to accomplish sense-but sense is no official concern of a
formal-style court.7
No doubt the Formal Style of the age, and, perhaps more im-
portant still, the mediocrity and intense conservatism of many of the
judges, had their consequences in the realm of affairs. Many cases
were decided mechanically. The common law process of creative
change, through which the law meets and molds the flow of social
experience, was slowed up. The law became too static, too resistant
to pressure from without, cut off from the sources of its vitality in
the stuff of life.
The reaction of opinion was sharp, and explosive, and it has
continued in various forms to our own time. The need for the
struggle remains, for the old orthodox idea of law as a fixed body
of received rules, divorced from policy, has a tenacious hold on the
minds of men. The battle-cry of the counter-attack was Holmes'
famous opening page of The Common Law, published in 1881, and
still the rallying point, and point of beginning, for most phases of
the struggle to recover and re-establish effective methods for pur-
suing the reform of law, and social reform through law.
6. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, JUDGE AND JURIST IN THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (1959).
for a witty and ironic account of the process, and its denouement.
7. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING ApPEALS 38 (1960).
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The object of this book is to present a general view
of the Common Law. To accomplish the task, other tools
are needed besides logic. It is something to show that the
consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is
not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corol-
laries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it
is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to
become. We must alternately consult history and existing
theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be
to understand the combination of the two into new products
at every stage. The substance of the law at any given time
pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is
then understood to be convenient; but its form and mach-
inery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired
results, depend very much upon its past.
In Massachusetts to-day, while, on the one hand, there
are a great many rules which are quite sufficiently accounted
for by their manifest good sense, on the other, there are some
which can only be understood by reference to the infancy
of procedure among the German tribes, or to the social con-
ditIOn of Rome under the Decemvirs.8
These views and their reception measured deep movements in
American and European thought. Great man though Holmes was,
he did not strike off these passages, and others of like tenor, wholly
through private revelation. The view he took represented in large
part a collision between the static notions of law which prevailed
among lawyers at the time, and the revolutionary development of
historical studies. By 1880, the German, French and English writers
about history, sociology, and philology, after more than a century of
cumulative effort, were beginning to transform our consciousness of
the past, and of the nature of the social process. Holmes' thought
owed much as well to philosophy and to the impact on philosophy of
science. William James and Peirce, both important philosophers
of science and its methods, were his friends. The founders of American
pragmatism shared with Holmes and other young Bostonians the
delights of the Metaphysical Club, a philosophical society founded
in 1870, or thereabouts, to discuss "none but the tallest and broadest
questions."1l The development of science, and the ideas of Darwin
and Huxley, were in the forefront of their thought. And, above all,
8. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1·2 (1881).
9. Frank, A Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of
Legal Pragmatism, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 427 (1954).
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by natural descent in the literature of law, Holmes and his fellow
lawyers in the group were under the spell of Bentham, and the other
Utilitarians, but especially of Bentham, that extraordinary figure, far
in advance of his time, whose writings have not yet begun to exhaust
their capacity to stir men to action.
Holmes' Common Law) and his other scholarly papers, proved to
be genuinely fruitful and productive. They have contributed to
all the streams of thought and debate which have so strongly colored
the intellectual universe in which the modern American lawyer is
formed. For sixty years, or thereabouts, following the publication
of his book and his early articles, American law has been enlivened
and illuminated by a Homeric series of debates addressed to the
themes he had sounded.
The protagonists were a singularly colorful and often eccentric
group of highly individual individualists. And their debate was
lively, vigorous and usually very combative indeed. As Felix
Cohen wrote, "In the lists of jurisprudence, the champion of a new
theory is generally expected to prove the virtue of the lady for whom
he fights by splitting the skulls of those who champion other ladies."lO
If you run over their articles and book reviews, in the bound volumes
of the old law journals, you can still catch an authentic whiff of
cordite. The contributors to the debate were, and some of them still
are, a formidable lot, and I hope the next generation can
produce their equals. The lists included Hohfeld and Walter
Wheeler Cook, Bentley, Pound, Jerome, Frank, Kocourek,
Underhill Moore, Oliphant, Dickinson, Llewellyn, Thurman Arnold,
Radin, Yntema, both Cohens, Hutcheson, Goodhart, Arthur Corbin,
McDougal and Lasswell, Fuller and Kantorowicz. Many words have
been used to describe the attitudes towards law which were
expressed and applied in the course of this debate: pragmatism and
positivism; functionalism and institutionalism; realism and idealism;
jurisprudence sociological, operational, gastronomic, non-Euclidean,
transcendental; the jurisprudence of values, of skepticism, and of
cynicism. On the whole, none of the labels is of much use in describ-
ing either the terms of the debate, or the prevailing state of thought
which is its outcome.
I started by stressing a difference of view as to the place of
legal rules in the legal process as the beginning of the modern
American battle over the function and nature of law. The significance
and propriety of these rules has remained a central issue in almost all
phases of the discussion. The debate was part of a more generalized
reconsideration of the respective roles of reason and nature in the
process of learning, and in the creation of organized bodies of know-
10. F.S. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 77 (1960).
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ledge. In the legal literature, as in the literature about the philo-
sophy of science, the words "rule" and "reason," "fact" and "prin-
ciple," were used in a bewildering variety of denotations, which
added to the excitement, if not to the coherence of the argument.
There was a general atmosphere of skepticism, often of mistrust,
as the reformers approached the citadel of the rules of law. They
agreed, by and large, on two positions: first, that under legal customs
all would accept, many, perhaps most of the cases which reached
appellate courts could only be decided in one way; and second, that
in many instances the judge had a significant range of choice in
deciding the case: choice in finding the facts, which Judge Frank
stressed, or choice among rules, and in their interpretation. As
Cardozo put it in his classical Storrs Lecture at Yale:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this,
and little more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility,
and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces
which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law.
Which of these forces shall dominate in any case, must de-
pend largely upon the comparative importance or value of
the social interests that will be thereby promoted or im-
paired. One of the most fundamental social interests is
that law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be
nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or
even arbitrary whim or fitfulness. Therefore in the main
there shall be adherence to precedent. There shall be sym-
metrical development, consistently with history or custom
when history or custom has been the motive force, or the
chief one, in giving shape to existing rules, and with logic
or philosophy when the motive power has been theirs. But
symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price.
Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity
of oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or
certainty must then be balanced against the social interest
served by equity and fairness or other elements of social wel-
fare. These may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing
the line at another angle, of staking the path along new
courses, of marking a new point of departure from which
others who come after him will set out upon their journey.
If you ask how he is to know when one interest out-
weighs another, I can only answer that he must get his
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and
study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here, indeed,
is the point of contact between the legislator's work and his.
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in
the end be guided by like considerations for the one as for
the other. Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his
competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower.
He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces
in the law. How far he may go without traveling beyond
the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for him upon
a chart.ll
I I. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-14 (1921).
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In short, the judge is inevitably concerned with policy, since law is
"a means to social ends, and not an end in itself."12 He makes law,
and does not merely find it.
Many of the writers who participated in the discussions con·
centrated on the artificial and unreal character of many legal rules.
They were preoccupied with demonstrating that existing rules were
meaningless, or circular, or self-contradictory, like the concept of
"implied malice" which drew Holmes' scorn,13 Some then went on,
seeking to formulate new rules which would more accurately describe
the law in action. Law, Sabine said, is "what it does,"14 not what the
judges say they are doing, or why. Others sought to investigate the
effects of the existing law, as in court administration, bankruptcy, or
divorce, or the relation between doctrines of law and patterns of
custom or usage.
Many of the realists were heatedly accused of nihilism or worse,
and charged with denying the generalizing element of law altogether.
They were alleged to believe that decisions were based on unstated
interests or value preferences, and that the reasons given for decisions
were in fact after.thoughts, cynical rationalizations, representing the
judge not as a conscientious lawyer, working within the permissible
limits of his discretion, but as a willful autocrat. By and large
(though with several exceptional and occasional aberrations) the
charge was not justified: the realist literature agreed with Pekelis'
striking remark, amending one of Holmes' most famous quips, that
"concrete cases cannot be decided by general propositions-nor with-
out them."15 The realists-or most of them-were not trying to deny
the inevitability of rules in a system of law that sought at any given
time to decide like cases alike. What they were trying to achieve
was an awareness of the relationship between rules and policy, view-
ing law as an instrument for social action in a society constantly in
flux, "and in flux typically faster than the law, so that the probability
is always given that any portion of law needs reexamination to deter-
mine how far it fits the society it purports to serve."16
When all the rules were re-examined and reformulated, when
everyone understood and accepted the tentative nature of rules, and
their relation to the customs and morals of society, what then?
Should modern lawyers, worthy to be welcomed as brothers into the
fellowship of "Realism", "Liberalism" and "Enlightment", devote
12. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (1931).
13. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REV. I (1894); HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS lI7 (1920).
14. Sabine, The Pragmatic Approach to Politics, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 865,
878 (1930). This view, essentially Gray's, was effectively criticized by Cardozo,
op. cit. supra note lI, at 125-30.
15. PEKELlS, LAw AND SOCIAL ACTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 20 (1950).
16. Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 1236.
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their attention to the law as it was at their moment of study, or to
the law as it ought to be? In the early stages of the campaign, the
rebels were anxious to concentrate - temporarily, in Llewellyn's
phrase - on the law that was, and to set aside for the future the
problem of the law that ought to beP It was difficult enough, they
thought, to show that the law recited in appellate decisions had lost
contact with the mores of the community, and the law in action.
The first job was to clear away the circular syllogisms and the
meaningless concepts; to dispose of rules which had no other reason
to support them than that so it had been in the time of an ancient
Henry; and to annul, test, reformulate, and review all legal rules in
the light of their factual background and effect. IS
But was this the whole task of law and of legal scholarship?
Was there no more to the lawyer's job than to see to it that the law
corresponds to the felt needs of the community, and maintains ade-
quate means for knowing such needs, through its use of analytic
procedures, and of methods and data drawn from economics, political
theory, psychology and sociology? Is the only end to be served that
the law discover itself accurately, realistically, to make it the mirror
of custom, rather than an instrument of higher values?ISa
One of the most significant criticisms of the realist movement
stressed this thought-that the realists denied the problem of judging
the goodness or badness of law, beyond the single issue of the
correspondence between the law in the books and the law in action:
that is, between positive law and custom. Hadn't Holmes, following
Bentham, laughed at the very idea of natural law, and favored
the "separation" of law and morals?IO Had he not said that justice
was not his business as a judge, but only playing the game according
to its rules? And did he not remark that "the prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law."20
There is a paradox in this charge against the modern movement
in American thought about law, for the legal realists were among our
most devoted and effective reformers, both of law and of society.
Professor McDougal commented on the charge in these terms:
The American legal realism which Professor Fuller
attacks is ... a bogus American legal realism. John Austin,
Kelsen, and others, from abroad and at home, may have done
their bit to "separate the inseparable," but most of the men
whose names appear upon Professor Llewellyn's famous list
of American legal realists are innocent men. So also are
17. Id. at 1223. 1236, 1254.
18. rd. at 1240.
18a. See note 1 supra.
19. See HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310 (1920); BIDDLE, JUSTICE
HOLMES, NATURAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1961).
20. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
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most of their followers. They do not deny that the law-in·
fact (rules and behavior) embodies somebody's ethical
notions (how absurd it would be to deny itl); on the con·
trary, they are the people who have been most insistent
that it has too often embodied an ossified ethics, inherited
from previous centuries and opposed to the basic human
needs of our time. More clearly than any of their critics,
the realists have appreciated that legal rules are but the
normative declarations of particular individuals, conditioned
by their own peculiar cultural milieu, and not truths reo
vealed from on high. Most of their writing has in fact
been for the avowed purpose of freeing people from the
emotional compulsion of antiquated legal doctrine and so
enabling them better to J?ursue their hearts' desires. Not
bothering to explain how Judges can legislate, it is they who
have insisted that judges do and must legislate, that is, make
a policy decision, in every case. The major tenet of the
"functional approach," which they have so vigorously es-
poused, is that law is instrumental only, a means to an end,
and is to be appraised only in the light of the ends it
achieves. Any divorce they may at times have urged between
.is and ought has been underscored always as temporary,
solely for the purpose of preventing their preferences from
obscuring a clear understanding of the ways and means for
securing such preferences. Directly contrary to Professor
Fuller's charges, they have sought to distinguish between the
is and the ought, not for the purpose of ignoring or dis-
missing the ought, but for the purpose of making a future
is into an ought for its time.21
On the whole, Professor McDougal is right in his judgment,
although there is a great deal on both sides of the debate about
"the Law that is" and "the Law that ought to be" which is purely
formal, inconclusive, and irrelevant.22 There is more to modern
American jurisprudence than the cheerful clatter of breaking idols,
as we can see in the debate that is raging about the work of the
Supreme Court.
Holmes had put his definition of law into the future tense. It
was never enough, he said, to discover what the law really was at a
given moment. What would it become tommorow? What forces would
influence the law to change, and what fruit would come of the pro-
cess of change? To answer that question, Holmes urged with equal
vigor, the lawyer had to understand and consider the ideas playing on
the formation of law-the pressures for social change in many areas,
from banking and bankruptcy to labor law and the law of torts. He
had to master all the sciences of society, from anthropology to stat-
istics. And he had to know the judges, their prejudices and predilec-
21. McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention,
50 YALE L.J. 827, 834·35 (1941).
22. Insightfully reviewed in Jenkins, The Matchmaker, or Toward a Synthesis
of Legal Idealism and Positivism, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1959); also treated in Rostow,
The Enforcement of Morals, CAlIlBRIDGE L.J. 174, 185-92 (1960).
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tions, their zeal to participate in the growth of the law, or to resist it.
After all, Holmes spoke of law not only as a prediction of what the
judges would in fact decide, but also as the "witness and external
deposit of our moral life," and of its history as "the history of the
moral development of the race."23
During the past twenty years or so, the stress in the American
literature about law has been on this part of the equation-the quest
for standards and values in the process of guiding the evolution of
"the law that is" into the law we think it ought to become. The
formulation and acceptance of ends, these writers know, helps to
fix the line of growth of the law. Of those who have contributed
this panel to the body of our thought about law, I might mention
particularly Felix Cohen, F.S.C. Northrop, Messrs. Laswell and Mc-
Dougal, Henry Hart, Friedrich Kessler, Jerome Hall, Lon Fuller and
Edmond Cahn. Their work has helped to correct and offset the
relative neglect of the problem of values which characterized the
more positivistic outlook of the earlier legal realists.24
The emerging awareness of these three themes in their relations
to each other constitutes a new synthesis of ideas about law, which
tends to dominate the universe of American law today. (1) That
synthesis accepts, and nowadays accepts without protest, the use of
generalization, as a limited but essential part of the process of making
legal decisions. (2) It stresses the links between the actual law and
what Ehrlich and Northop, following Montesquieu, call the living
law of society, the mass of its customs and usages, animated by the
exisiting Spirit of its Laws, the norm for law towards which it seeks
to move in its day to day processes of law making. This phase of
the problem requires the lawyer and judge to go far beyond the
traditional data of the law books, and to investigate the functioning
of society, and the minds of men. And (3) it recognizes the necessity
to acknowledge and to seek to define the standards of aspiration
in the minds of judges and other law-makers which govern the
development both of society itself, and of its Spirit of Law. Some
identify this third element in the legal process, a culture's ideal for
the future of its law, as "natural law," a phrase of many ambiguities,
and seek to study it objectively, with all the apparatus of modern
scholarship.
IV
This set of working rules about the nature and social function
of law has certain corollaries for the profession of law. If a lawyer
or a judge or a law professor understands law to be no more than a
23. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 170 (1920).
24. This theme in the American literature corresponds to a world-wide
revival of interest in the problem of standards for law, stimulated by the problem
of law under circumstances of Fascist and Communist dictatorship. See RADCLIFFE,
THE LAw AND ITs COMPASS (1960).
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beautifully articulated set of formal rules, derived from Blackstone
and the dictionary, then he can be a good and conscientious lawyer
by putting the right words in the right order, and turning the crank
of logic to get the right result. The lawyer's duty has quite another
connotation if he believes law to be the instrument through which
a changing society seeks to express and fulfill its aspirations for
justice. If the lawyer lives by a limited and old-fashioned version
of legal positivism, he professes to leave "policy" changes, and their
impact on law, entirely to others-to the legislatures, or the econo-
mists, or to the political process. A judge of this persuasion is suffused
with a glow of satisfaction if he recites the received words in the
received order, and obtains a result which seems to conform to the
letter he has learned. If the result is contrary to what he thinks
society regards as right, just and desirable, he may glow with extra
pleasure, for to many devotees of law in this sense, nothing so
demonstrates the rigor and value of the law as a harsh result.
If, however, the lawyer, judge, legislator or law teacher has
absorbed the concept of law I have been trying to describe, he knows
that he cannot escape so easily. He must live with uncomfortable
thoughts. He sees every social conflict, every case, no matter how
small, as an inseparable part of a larger whole. For him, each settle-
ment, each decision, each opinion derives its validity and its legi-
timacy from his conscientious effort to make certain that it represents
not only law, but good law. The lawyer, the legislator, the judge and
the law professor have different functions, different degrees of discre-
tion, different zones of choice. But they confront the same standard
of duty and responsibility. The modern lawyer can find no workable
boundary between law and policy, for he acknowledges law to be
policy expressed in certain forms. His motto is Brandeis' remark,
"No question is ever settled until it is settled right." For him, the
sense of the profession, the sense which justifies it, and makes it
worthy of his dreams, is precisely that it is and must be the appointed
agency of our society's sense of justice.
If we look at the work of our profession, and at its influence on
society and on the law, in the light of the standard whose develop-
ment and acceptance I have been discussing tonight, to what con-
clusion are we led?
-A-
First, what of the Supreme Court, our highest institution of law,
which has been criticized recently, as it has been criticized throughout
its history, as a partisan and arbitrary body, recklessly writing its
own prejudices into the law? If I am right in my summary of the
prevailing American view of law, and if that view correctly states
what our society expects of its law, most of these criticisms stand
revealed to be untenable, and mistaken.
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I have discussed on other occasions some of the popular criticisms
of the Court-that its powers of judicial review are undemocratic;
that it is behaving as a legislative and not a judicial body in its
interpretations of the Constitution; that it is going too far and too
rapidly in its development of our law of civil rights; and that it is
violating the Constitution by interfering with the constitutional pre-
rogatives of the state governments. I shall not undertake here to
repeat what I have said in those papers to defend the main lines of
the Court's work, and to answer its critics in detail.25
I might, however, briefly discuss the most important recent
attack on the Court, Professor Wechsler's Holmes Lecture at the Har-
vard Law School.26 In that influential speech, Professor Wechsler
advanced the view that in its recent work, and notably in some of its
most important recent decisions, the Court has breached basic stand-
ards of judicial propriety, and wandered into the forbidden realm
of decision by fiat. He implied that his approach could be resisted
only by those "who, vouching no philosophy to warranty, frankly
or covertly make the test of virtue in interpretation whether its result
in the immediate decision seems to hinder or advance the interests
or the values they support."27 The nub of Professor Wechsler's argu-
ment, distinguishing political from judicial decisions, appears, I think,
in this passage from his lecture:
All I have said, you may reply, is something no one will
deny, that princil?les are largely instrumental as they are
employed in politICS, instrumental in relation to results that
a controlling sentiment demands at any given time. Poli-
ticians recognize this fact of life and are obliged to trim and
shape their speech and votes accordingly, unless perchance
they are prepared to step aside; and the example that John
Quincy Adams set somehow is rarely followed.
That is, indeed, all I have said but I now add that
whether you are tolerant, perhal?s more tolerant than I, of
the ad hac in politics, with prinCIple reduced to a manipula-
tive tool, are you not also ready to agree that something else
is called for from the courts? I put it to you that the main
constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that
is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved. To
be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the case
they have before them. But must they not decide on grounds
of adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by
the instant application but by others that the principles
25. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1952); Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 573 (1958); Rostow, The Court and Its Critics, 4 SO. TEX. L.J. 160 (1959).
26. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959), reprinted in WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW 3-48 (1961) [hereinafter cited as WESCHSLER, with page references to the book].
27. WECHSLER 17.
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imply? Is it not the very essence of judicial method to insist
upon attending to such other cases, preferably those involv-
ing an opposing interest, in evafuating any principle
avowed?28
Some have found in the words and tenor of the lecture con-
tradictions and obscurities, particularly with regard to the weight
the Court should give in doubtful cases to the presumption of con-
stitutionality, and to the contrary views of the legislators or executive
officers whose decisions are being reviewed by the Court. 29 I do
not deny that these ambiguities exist in the text, nor that they raise
difficult problems. Moreover, I find that the concepts of "reason",
"principle", "generality" and "neutrality" on which Professor Wech-
sler's argument depends are employed in several ways, and apparently
derive from different definitions. They seem to apply an original
philosophic system, which Profesor Wechsler has not yet published,
for analyzing the judicial process. Perhaps fair criticism of the premise
and thesis of his Holmes' Lecture should wait on the appearance of
Professor Wechsler's jurisprudential views, for the lecture is clearly
part of a much larger whole. It was also, however, an act of current
significance in the formation of thought. We must do our best,
therefore, as is so often the case, to try to reconstruct the mastodon
from the few bones and teeth which happen to be on hand. The
task is somewhat simplified by the availability of an approved gloss.
Professor Wechsler has agreed with the reading given his lecture by
Professor Henkin in a recent paper, and I shall start at least by
examining that interpretation of his words.so
To Professor Henkin, Professor Wechsler's text implies no more
than the commonplace with which I began this analysis: that general-
ized rules are essential to the legal process in order to protect society
against judicial partiality, and to assure that like cases be decided
alike. As Professor Henkin says felicitously, in trying to restate
Professor Wechsler's argument as "a call for principle," "one might
do worse for the beginning of a definition than to suggest that
judicial doctrine and principle are those reasons for reaching a result
which can be stated in a judicial opinion."sl If this is indeed an
adequate reading of the lecture, Professor Wechsler's charge, backed
by the high and deserved authority of his reputation, is a most
28. WECHSLER 21. See F.S. CoHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 34-40
(1959) .
29. See Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960); Mueller and Schwartz, The Principle
of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 571 (1960). See also the powerful article
of Judge Clark and Mr. Trubek on the same themes, Clark and Trubek, The
Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition,
71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961).
30. Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 637, 652-62 (1961).
31. [d. at 655.
HeinOnline -- 34 Rocky Mntn. L. Rev. 138 1961-1962
138 34 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW (1962)
serious one-that the Supreme Court is not behaving like a court at
all, but is deciding similar cases differently, depending on whether
favored or disfavored parties or interests are before the Court-parties
or interests favored or disfavored, let us be clear, not because their
positions should be considered different in fact and in law, but
simply because the judges happen to be partisans of one, and not the
other. The charge, in short, is that the judges are applying personal
and idiosyncratic standards of policy in shaping the development of
the law, and not their understanding of what the community'S
standards, stated in the Constitution or the statutes, have become.
In a recent article, Dean Griswold, while not committing himself to
Professor Wechsler's view, has carefully indicated that he regards
the question as an open one:
If decisions are reached on the basis of "absolute con-
victions" rather than through the painful intellectual effort
of judgment in the light of the law, then the judicial pro-
cess is not in its finest flower.... Though it is clear that
judges do "make law," and have to do so, it remains the
fact that this is, at its best, an understanding process, not an
emotional one, a self-effacing process, not a means of vin-
dicating "absolute convictions." It is a process requiring
great intellectual power, an open and inquiring and re-
sourceful mind, and often courage, especially intellectual
courage, and the power to rise above oneself. Even more
than intellectual acumen, it requires intellectual detach-
ment and disinterestedness, rare qualities approached only
through constant awareness of their elusiveness, and constant
striving to attain them. If one regarded himself as having a
special mission to fulfill, or if he were quite largely the pris-
oner of his absolute convictions, he would not meet the
highest standards of judicial performance. When decisions
are too much result-oriented, the law and the public are
not well served....
Our judges carry a heavy burden. They make a supreme
contribution in our society. They are entitled to our thought-
ful and respectful consideration as they carry out their
difficult task of disinterested exposition and development
of the law of the land.32
To me, Professor Wechsler's lecture-though not Dean Griswold's
comment on the issues raised in it-represents a repudiation of all
we have learned about law since Holmes published his Common Law
in 1881, and Roscoe Pound followed during the first decade of this
century with his path-breaking pleas for a result-oriented, sociological
jurisprudence, rather than a mechanical one. It would raise the
element of rules, of precedent, of what he calls "principle" or "reason"
in the judicial process to a position of absolute primacy which all
we know about law denies.
In this regard, Professor Wechsler goes well beyond Professor
32. Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge
Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 93·94 (1960).
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Henkin's reassuring interpretation of his lecture. For Professor
Wechsler, unlike Professor Henkin, would require opinions of a
defined kind and quality in every case, or have the Court abstain
from action-presumably leaving in effect lower court opinions, or
actions of other branches of the government which might have even
less legal justification. And Professor Wechsler's criteria for the
goodness of an opinion are more categorical than those suggested by
Professor Henkin.
For this reason, as best I can read his text, I conclude that
Professor Wechsler's argument is an attack on the integrity of the
Supreme Court. For him, a decision has "any legal quality," which
I interpret to mean "legitimacy," only if it is "entirely principled,"
that is, only if it "rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in
the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality trans-
cend any immediate result that is involved."33 The quality of "legal
quality" (or legitimacy) seems to be sharply different in Professor
Wechsler's system from simple error, taken for granted as a normal
and inevitable feature of the legitimate judicial process. 34 And it
emerges as a curiously shifting and elusive entity, to be recognized
intuitively, and then only by some. According to Professor Wechsler's
rule, a judicial decision must be branded illegitimate, and condemned
to limbo, if two conditions are satisfied: (1) if the Court fails to give
a satisfactorily reasoned explanation of its result in terms of neutral
principles; and (2) if the Court could not have given such an explan-
ation, that is, if no one outside the Court succeeds, presumably within
a reasonable interval of limitation, in advancing suitable reasons of
principle to accoutn for the Court's decision. But how can we tell that
"no one" has given or can possibly give an account of the decision
which meets the standard? The judges, presumably, have tried, al-
though they would hardly agree with Professor \Vechsler's verdict of
failure.
Professor Wechsler illustrates and applies his test in his discussion
of three recent cases, which represent some of the Court's most im-
portant modern work. 35 These cases, he says, "have the best chance
of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our society of
any that I know in recent years."36 But in these cases Professor
33. WECHSLER 27. See also, WECHSLER 21-23.
34. I may be wrong in reading Professor Wechsler's text as so sharply dis-
tinguishing "legal quality" from the commonplace of error, or of poor opinion.
writing. Despite his patient and generous efforts, in conversation and in letters,
however, I find it impossible to read the lecture otherwise, for (qUite apart from
the language he uses) the tenor and sequence of his argument seems to attach
far more drastic consequences to decisions and opinions lacking "any legal quality"
than to those merely in error (see, e.g., his comment at pp. 35-36 that while
Mr. Justice Holmes' "clear and present danger" test failed as analysis, one must
respect it as an attempt to develop a principled delineation of the problem) .
35. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. WECHSLER 37.
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Wechsler believes that the Court did not advance "clear" reasons
of principle to defend its decisons;37 and, by earnest effort, he has
failed to adduce satisfactory rationalizations for the decisions him-
self.3s Therefore, in his view, the choices of other branches of the
government should have been allowed to survive,30 since the pre-
sumption of constitutionality was not overcome. The results he
applauds should have been achieved by political and not by judicial
means. The decisions were not merely erroneous, but lacked legal
quality. They represent ad hoc and unprincipled decision making,
and the Supreme Court as an unprincipled power-organ.
We are left with the cold but correct proposition that we should
obey an erroneous construction of the law-even one lacking legal
quality-until it is changed, by reason of our general duty to obey
the law in a Rechtstaat.4o
I do not have the same difficulties Professor Wechsler has in
fitting these cases, hard as they are, into perspectives of constitutional
development. Many of the Socratic questions he poses by way of
criticism seem easy to answer, or to leave for a future court, in
accordance with the habits of the common law. For example, the
impact of Court-enforced racial covenants on land-use, affecting the
social and political lives of whole communities, strikes me as readily
distinguishable from purely private utilizations of property, and
hardly alien to traditional "public policy" limits on one's freedom to
use or dispose of his own. But others have dealt with Professor
Wechsler's treatment of these cases.41 In this lecture, I shall address
myself to his premise: even if we were to conclude, as he does, that
the opinions in question are inadequate or unsatisfactory, does it
follow for that reason that the decisions were not only erroneous,
but that they lacked "legal quality," and that the act of making them
was a usurpation of power?
For me, Professor Wechsler's view is much too narrowly based.
Even the task of reaching the conclusion that a Court's decision is
37. WECHSLER 34. The reqUirement that the courts "impose a choice of
values on the other branches or a state, based upon the Constitution, only when
they are persuaded, on an adequate and principled analysis, that the choice is
clear," is one of the most dangerous standards for judicial action in the lecture.
Clear to whom? The dissenting justices? It does no service to jUdges whose
most routine tasks imply difficult analyses of complex factual situations, the
evaluation of converging and competing interests and values, and the ordering
of all the other forces which affect the growth of the Constitution, to tell them
that they cannot act unless all becomes "clear." See Rostow, The Democratic
Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193,214-15 (1952); C. L. BLACK, JR.,
THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 13 (1960).
38. WECHSLER 47.
39. WECHSLER 27.
40. WECHSLER 47. See RADCLIFFE, THE LAW AND ITS COMPASS 82 (1960).
41. See, e.g., Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply
to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. I (1959); C.L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness
Of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). See Henkin, op. cit. supra
note 30, at 635, 661-62.
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erroneous calls for a far deeper and wider appraisal of the policies
it represents, and of their alternatives, than a verbal analysis of the
opinion as a piece of literature or rhetoric. And it takes much more,
in the light of what we know of the historical limits of the judicial
power, to conclude that an erroneous decision, or a decision de-
fended by an inadequate opinion, is ultra vires.
Speaking of the generalizing, propositional element in law,
Pound wrote-and I repeat what I quoted earlier-that law is "a
reasoned body of principles for the administration of justice . . . a
means towards an end, and it must be judged by the results it achieves
... , not by the beauty of its logical processes or the strictness with
which its rules proceed from the dogmas it takes for its foundation."4\!
Of course we should all prefer the Courts to write clear, coherent
and persuasive opinions, strictly disciplined by what Dean Griswold
rightly calls the "tightly guided process" of the judicial tradition.
Of course we want our judges to be impartial, detached,
and mindful of the limits of their discretion, as well as
conscientious in discharging the burden and responsibility which
that discretion imposes upon them. In this connection I often think
with admiration and respect of the fact that Mr. Justice Brandeis,
for all his convictions about the "curse of bigness," never wrote an
opinion in the government's favor in an antitrust case.
But, if we know anything at all about law, we know that the
goal which Professor Wechsler makes his only test for judicial
propriety is impossible to achieve; that it never has been achieved by
any common law court, nor by any other Court; and that it never
can be achieved, in the nature of the judicial process. It is the
essence of our system of law that we require our judges to do their
best to make their decisions in conformity to the rules of judicial
action, with great deference to the past, and a strict sense of the
boundaries of their power. And, for reasons which go deep into our
history, we require them in most cases, but not in all, to write
opinions conforming to standards which tradition has established
for that exacting art.
Any lawyer who has worked through a line of cases about
easements or trusts or bills and notes or any other legal subject,
knows that no court has ever achieved perfection in its reasoning in
its first, or indeed in its twentieth opinion on the same subject.
Law professors make their modest livings in large part by dissecting
judicial opinions, and helping their students to see how imperfectly
most of them satisfy Professor 'Wechsler's rule, and other, even more
important standards for the evaluation of judicial action. In the
nature of law as a continuing process, constantly meeting the shocks
of social change, and of changes in people's ideas of justice, this
42. Pound, supra note 2.
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characteristic of law must be true, even for our greatest and most
insightful judges. They grapple with a new problem, deal with it
over and over again, as its dimensions change. They settle one case,
and find themselves tormented by its unanticipated progeny. They
back and fill, zig and zag, groping through the mist for a line of
thought which will in the end satisfy their standards of craft and
their vision of the policy of the community they must try to interpret.
The opinions written at the end of such a cycle rarely resemble those
composed at the beginning. Exceptions emerge, and new formula-
tions of what once looked like clear principle. If we take advantage
of hindsight, we can see in any line of cases and statutes a pattern of
growth, and of response to changing conditions and changing ideas.
There are cases that lead nowhere, stunted branches and healthy
ones. Often the judges who participated in the process could not
have described the tree that was growing. Yet the felt necessities of
society have their impact, and the law emerges, gnarled, asymmetrical,
but very much alive-the product of a forest, not of a nursery garden,
nor of the gardener's art.
Often, of course, the structure and content of a court's opinion
can be explained by the debates of the judges who must vote on it.
One is an enthusiast for one principle, others for another. The
human process of persuasion within an appellate court accounts,
as we know, for many anomalies and worse in the final published ver-
sion of a court's views.
Beyond these normal problems of intellectualizing the judicial
process-problems of insight, scholarship, and policy-there are special
pressures which are strongly felt by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Exercising high political powers, the Court must have a
high sense of strategy and tactics. Its influence on our public life
depends in large part on the Court's skill in advocacy, and its sensi-
tivity to the powerful forces which from time to time, in different
combinations, must resist its will. When the Court decides to accept
or reject cases, to decide them on this ground or that, to issue warning
dicta which are then not made the basis for decision, it is necessarily
performing a ,function far more complex than Professor Wechsler's
call for candor in meeting every issue in every case on the basis of
neutral principles of adequate generality. If the Court had in fact
lived by Professor Wechsler's rule, it would have disappeared long
since from the stage of American life. The great Chief Justice, John
Marshall, is the classic examplar and exponent of political prudence
in the employment of the Court's powers. Wisely judging the strength
of the conflicting forces whose conjuncture influences the growth of
the law, carefully husbanding the Court's strength for the crucial
issues, shrewdly choosing among alternative possible premises for its
opinions, he still had the energy, vision and courage to make the
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written Constitution into the constitution-in-fact for a nation. His
opinions were a powerful educational force in the dialogues of the
community, his decisions the walls, foundations and boundary lines
of an heroic architectural plan. But few of them can be described as
full and direct answers to every problem presented by the cases before
the Court.42a
For the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has been dealing
with a rising tide of new demands, and new problems. Our society
has lived through a grinding depression, two wars, and the difficult
and novel strains of the Cold War. It has maintained a large military
establishment in times of nominal peace. And, most important of
all, it has been called upon to make good the promises we made to
our Negro citizens almost a hundred years ago, at a time when the
place of the Negro in our society has been revolutionized, and the
problem of race relations has taken on momentous contours in the
setting of world politics.
The Court has been struggling with the judicial problems cast
up by these events, with varying degrees of success. No student of
its work could agree with all its decisions, nor with all the opinions
written to explain them. Certainly I do not. I have criticized both
the results and the opinions in many of its cases. But I should deny
that the present Supreme Court is doing the expository, opinion-
writing part of its job any worse, or any better, than most of its pre-
decessors. By my lights, many of its opinions, and of its decisions
too, are quite human and erratic variations on certain themes. But
behind the variations, it is not hard to see the long-term trends.
These long lines of constitutional development, I believe, are entirely
in the spirit of our constitutional tradition. They represent the
honorable attempt of honorable judges, sensitive to their calling, to
do their duty as judges, not as legislators or as rulers by fiat. I stress
that the work of the Court is work in process, and that the positions
it takes today will not necessarily be those it takes tomorrow. So it
was in the time of Marshall and Taney and Hughes. And thus it
must always be, so long as we elect to make the judicial process of
Anglo-American tradition one of our chief means of self-government.
The opinions of Marshall, and of every other strong judge who
has sat on the Court, have been criticized in exactly the terms Pro-
fessor Wechsler uses. Generations of writers about law, and of law
teachers, have dissected the erratic reasoning of kIarbury v. Madison,
and discovered that the statutory construction on which Gibbons v.
Ogden rests is artificial and strained. So be it. It is too bad. It
would be much better if our judges could consistently write con-
42a. The prudential factors in the choice of cases, and of grounds for decision,
are realistically canvassed in Bickel, Foreward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40, 42:51 (1961).
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vincing opinions, which earned an "A" by Professor Wechsler's rule;
it would be better still if they reached the results of "good law" in
all cases, whether through peccable or impeccable judicial opinions.
But no human beings, not even law professors, could possibly bring
such instantaneous order to the swirling freshets the judges must
confront every day of their lives. As Fifoot wrote recently, reviewing
the development of certain judicial doctrines and of theories about
them in nineteenth century England, "[ f] aced with the fragments of
life, the current law of any place and time can but approximate to
a principle or indicate a tendency."43 We must accept the fact that
under the best of circumstances honest judges, working within the
boundaries of their power, and strictly according to the customs of
their calling, will often write opinions which will fail to convince
many, or all, or the best lawyers of their time, or of later times. Their
decisions may nonetheless turn out to have been right or wrong, with
the benefit of hindsight, - in error, or in creative anticipation of a
principle theretofore unsensed. In the nature of the judicial process,
Professor Wechsler's rule puts unwarranted and misleading stress on
one phase of the judicial craft-a vital phase, but decidedly not the
whole of it, nor even its most important feature.
Having said this, I should go one step further. I should be
the last to deny the importance of the analytic process in the work-
ings of law. But there is an inescapable Bergsonian element of intui·
tion in the judges' work-in their ordering of "facts," in their choice
of premises, in their reformulation of the postulates we call "rules"
or "principles," in their sense of the policy or policies which animate
the trend, or change it. These are the secret roots, as Holmes said
long ago, "from which the law draws all the juices of life." They
may be, as he said "the unconscious result of instinctive preferences
and inarticulate convictions,44 but in the end they must rule. This is
not to say that the law is "a mass of unrelated decisions" or "a product
of judicial bellyaches."45 The force of law as a system and tradition
is and should be great, in defining the scope of judicial discretion.
The judicial process and the academic study of law alike become
mature and responsible when both judges and academic students of
the law acknowledge the legitimate interplay of these factors in the
act of decision, and seek to deal with them as functionally, and as
directly, as the state of our knowledge permits.
If Professor Wechsler uses the words "principle," "general prin-
ciple" and "reason" to mean the reasoning of judicial opinions which
43. FIFOTI, op. cit. supra note 6, at 56.
44. HOLMES. THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881). This central feature of the
judicial process is briefly summed up in Corbin, The Judicial Pl'OceSS Revisted:
An Introduction, 71 YALE L.J. 195, 199-201 (1961), and discussed more fully in
Clark and Trubek supra note 31 at 257-76.
45. F.S. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 70 (1960).
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convince some, or all, or only one good lawyer, in what sense can it
be said that this requirement carries with it a requirement of
"neutrality" as we11?46 . Neutrality, perhaps, in the spirit of Anatole
France's remark that in the eyes of the law the rich and the poor are
under an equal duty not to sleep beneath the bridges of Paris. Neutral-
ity, of course, in the sense that judgment should not be biased by fear,
or bribes, or, most important of all, by the lively political expectation
of votes or favors to come. If this is all "neutrality" means, then it is
hard to see what all the fuss is about. Professor Wechsler's notion of
neutrality seems to go further.
Could it mean that Marshall's major premise in approaching
any constitutional question-that the Constitution he was interpreting
was the blueprint for a nation, not for a confederation of sovereign
states-was not a permissibly "neutral" principle? Professor Wechsler
does not clearly indicate whether strongly held views of this order
about constitutional principles qualify as "neutral," save in his
passing comment on the "preferred position" controversy.47
There is another possibility. Does Wechslerian "neut-
rality" mean that in construing the Constitution the justices
should never declare statutes or administrative action invalid, unless
their action satisfies a standard which cannot be met? Is it the doc-
trine of judicial self-restraint carried to the point of complete
passivity? Would it deny all visible autonomous discretion to judges
who have been entrusted by history with the power to interpret and
apply the Constitution as law, in the setting of law suits? Does it
mean that in their essential task of discrimination-that is, of deciding
when situations should be treated differently by the law, - the judges
should disregard inequalities of bargaining position, or in voting
power; that the protection of individuals and minorities against
transitory majorities cease to be the dominant theme of the Bill of
Rights; that in reconciling the competing claims of different parts of
the Constitution, the Court not be required or allowed to decide,
to recall the theme of a recent Coen lecture, whether in a given
instance, and in the absence of statutory guidance, the Constitutional
interest in a fair trial outweighs in constitutional importance the
constitutional interest in a free press? It is difficult, at least it is
difficult for me, to determine how Professor Wechsler would answer
these questions. But doubts of this order as to his meaning remain
after many readings of his lecture.48
46. Professor Wechsler concedes the ambiguity of the word, but defends the
choice of an enigmatic word for an enigmatic subject. WECHSLER xiii.
47. WECHLSER 35. See, however, Henkin, op. cit. supra note 30, at 658·60.
48. Professor Wechsler does not, of course, favor a static Constitution, bound
to constructions prevalent in the 18th century. He welcomes the process of
adaptation and growth in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, so long
as that process is controIled by the criteria he advances. WECHSLER 22·26, 32-36.
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Criticisms like those we have been considering do not detract
from the greatness of the work Marshall did. Nor should they be
considered to detract from the achievements of our Court today.
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
That is the hard lesson Professor Wechsler has forgotten. His test
does justice to neither aspect of the process of law. On the side of
experience, Wechsler would deny the propriety of judgment, which
Cardozo made his central theme; and his view of "logic" represents
an inadequate and rudimentary notion of the philosophy and methods
of systematic thought.
-B-
If we turn for a moment from the Supreme Court to other
institutions of the legal profession, and seek to look at them in
the perspective of the standard I have sought to define, what findings
are indicated? One could examine the work of lawyers and of law
professors. But, for reasons of mercy in testing your patience, I shall
comment tonight on only a few aspects of the work of the organized
legal profession.
The national, regional and local bar associations, the American
Law Institute, and the American Bar Foundation are developing
rapidly. In the main, they are no longer merely social clubs, or
trade unions, concerned with fighting off competition from the
accountants, trust companies and insurance agents. They have
sponsored important research reports, like those of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, and the studies of the American
Law Institute. They have engaged in a variety of desirable programs
for the advanced professional training of lawyers. And they have
participated in some efforts at law reform, most notably those in the
field of procedure and judicial administration, and in efforts to raise
the standards of judicial appointment.
V,'hile much useful work has been done, and many promising
initiatives are being undertaken, I think the disinterested observer
must conclude that as yet the legal profession has not begun to fulfill
its obligation to society as an effective force for the vindication
and improvement of law.
Let me mention a few items of unfinished business as examples
of the kind of issues we must face as lawyers if we can hope to justify
ourselves to society. Our arrangements for providing legal aid to the
poor, both in civil and criminal cases, are in mOst communities
lamentably inadequate. The present state of legal aid programs is
a standing reproach to the legal profession. In most states, the
quality of judges is only fair. The practice of electing judges, or of
appointing them for limited terms, survives in most of the states, a
serious barrier to the possibility of truly impartial justice. In many,
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many communities, the judicial "fix" is reported to be commonplace-
a disgrace we have tolerated far too long. In the field of procedure,
despite the progress made under the federal rules, and their analogues
in many states, we still find indefensible delays in courts, cases
shuttling back and forth between courts, and masses of decisions on
purely procedural points which deny the very premise of procedural
reform. Our police practice, and our procedure in criminal cases,
are being slowly improved, thanks to the vigilant oversight of the
Supreme Court in this field. But the process of reform still depends
far too much on the accident of litigation, rather than on the affir-
mative efforts of bar associations, legislatures and judicial councils to
bring existing practice up to the standards announced by the Court.
Far too little is being done to improve and reform substantive law.
The enactment of new corporation laws and codes of correction, and
the progress of the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws highlight
as exceptions the slow movement in this area, and the weakness of
national efforts for improvement.
Beyond issues of this order, typical and general as they are, there
looms a far more serious and fundamental criticism of the perform-
ance of our bar, and of our law schools.
At the present time we are witnessing and enduring a sinister
challenge to the authority of law in our society. In many parts of
the South, governors and legislatures openly defy the courts of the
United States, and seek by one subterfuge after another to prevent
the orderly enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. These efforts
are supported by private groups, operating both publicly and in
secret. They employ boycotts, intimidation and open violence to
prevent Negroes from enforcing their legal rights, and to weaken
and disperse those within the decent and law-abiding majority who
are trying to uphold the purposes of the law.
Thus far, so far as I know, the organized bar, save for a few
notable exceptions, like that of the Houston Bar Association, has
stood silent, and walked by on the other side. It helped to repel
the dangerous attacks on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
mounted several years ago by Senator Jenner of Indiana, and others.
But it has done nothing more affirmative to assist the courts and the
nation in dealing with our crisis of legality. When explosions of mob
violence occurred in New Orelans last fall, as they had occurred
earlier in Little Rock, I do not recall seeing photographs of leading
lawyers, or Bar Association Presidents, standing with the few children,
parents and ministers who braved the threats and insults of the mob.
Nor do I recall public statements from the leaders of our profession,
since the time of Senator Pepper's appeal in 1956, urging public
support for the law, and willing compliance with its obvious purpose.
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With lonely splendor, the federal judges in the South have been
doing their duty under circumstances of appalling difficulty. The
law of the nation, which no majority would overturn, conflicts with
the prevailing customs of a region of the nation. This fact presents
a difficult, but by no means an unknown problem in the experience
of law. The federal judges in the South have proved themselves
worthy of the finest traditions of our legal system. Many of them,
I assume, might not have voted with the Supreme Court, had they
been its members when the segregation cases came up for decision.
That possibility makes their conduct now doubly noble. Their
courage and devotion in upholding the law, in the face of rancorous
and bitter hostility in their own communities, has written a proud
page in our legal history.
These judges deserve more than our praise from safe and
distant places. We-we, the bar, and we, the American public-have
left them too long alone in the line of battle. As Governor Collins
of Florida has repeatedly urged, public opinion should be effectively
mobilized and brought to bear, if we are to remain a community
of law. The profession of law has a plain duty to lead in the effort
to recreate a climate of legality in our society. I hope that our new
President will soon do what only a President can do in galvanizing
American opinion. And I wonder whether it would be useful for
Congressional Committees to investigate some of the really gross
activities which the White Citizens' Councils and their allies are
carrying on throughout the South. I make the suggestion as one who
believes in preserving broad powers of investigation for the Congress,
as the Grand Inquest of the American people. At the same time, I
have been, and I am critical of many features of the record. Many
of the investigating committees which have sought to expose Nazi and
Communist activities during the last twenty-five years have done
questionable jobs, with extremely high costs in intimidation. But I
am reluctant to believe it is beyond the will and wisdom of our law
to devise fair procedures for legitimate enquiries into alleged patterns
of coercive behavior which fall outside even the most latitudinarian
concept of legitimate political activity. In this perspective, I submit
that if any activities deserve to be called "subversive" and "Un-
American;' those carried on by the White Citizens' Councils and
kindred groups surely qualify. What could be more alien to our
constitutional tradition than the work of organized bodies which
seek to thwart the writ of the courts; to drive from their jobs and
homes people whose only offense is to believe in the law; to close
the public schools, and destroy the basis of modern democratic
society?
The challenge to social order implicit in this situation is more
than the negative one of ending active resistance to the law. The
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formal law of equality has been growing steadily in the United States
for two generations, case by case, statute by statute, executive order
by executive order. It has been nourished by the social advance of
the Negro in our society, and it has helped to make that advance
possible. We know that in many areas the law in fact-the living
law-does not yet match the precepts announced by the Supreme
Court as the law of the fourteenth amendment. The problem is a
national one, not a regional one. In some parts of the North there
are virtual boycotts by banks or real estate agents which prevent
Negroes and members of other minorities from buying homes of
their choice. Such boycotts are almost certainly illegal under the
Sherman Act, or under state laws against restraints of trade. The
problem of assuring effective equality in voting, or indeed assuring
the vote at all, is one in which practice is far behind the law, as the
valuable work of the Civil Rights Commission has demonstrated.
The same conclusion can be drawn, as we all know, in the field of
employment opportunity, where, among many other barriers to
equality, we still confront the phenomenon of "lily-white" trade
unions.
The task of the profession in this area should be to lead, not
merely to insist that the trickle of final decisions by the Supreme
Court be obeyed. There is work to be done in every community,
North and South, before we can begin to claim we are living up to
our own standards. The task is urgent. Violence breeds violence.
The Negro citizen has shown commendable patience, tolerance and
faith in his quiet and disciplined demeanor in the South. But the
rule of turning the other cheek is a hard one. It may not endure
indefinitely if we fail to make the performance of our law match its
professions.
In the end, however, the reasons which make action on this front
a necessity are different. They are reasons of conscience, not of
prudence. These things should be done not because they are politic,
but because they are right.
